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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing 
i 
the State to try Mr. Amador on the charge bf possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, wpen he had already been 
I 
acquitted of aggravated robbery by a jury pn the same evidence? 
• • • 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE $TATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
RAULE AMADOR, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Cake No. 860160 
Cajtagory No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction against Raule Amador 
for one count of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted 
Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-503 (1953 as amended). Mr. Amador was found guilty following 
a bench trial in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
I 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homej: F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FAfcTS 
Appellant, Raule Amador, was originally charged with one 
count of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) and 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a felony of 
the second degree, in violation of Utah qode Ann. §76-10-503 (1953 
as amended) (R. 11) (Addendum A). 
Prior to trial, the trial Court ordered that the possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person charge be severed from 
the aggravated robbery count pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9, 
Rule 9, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (T. 2, p. 8) (Addendum B). 
the first degree, in 
A jury trial on the aggravated robbery count proceeded on January 
20, 1986. Mr. Amador was acquitted of aggravated robbery on January 
21, 1986 (R. 75) (Addendum C). On February 11, 1985, Mr. Amador was 
tried by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on the charge of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and 
convicted (R. 85) (Addendum D). 
At the jury trial on the robbery charge the following 
evidence was presented, which was also relied on by the court in the 
subsequent trial on the possession of a dangerous weapon charge. 
On September 14, 1985, Mr. Amador accompanied his 
girlfriend, LuAnn McSharry, to the apartment of Danny Worthen and 
Wendy Bromfield, to collect a debt owed by Ms. Bromfield to Ms. 
McSharry's Grandmother (T. 1, p. 161).1 This was done at the 
request of Ms. McSharry's Grandmother (T. 1, p. 159). Both Worthen 
and Ms. Bromfield admitted owing the debt (T. 1, p. 33,66). When 
Mr. Worthen arrived at the apartment with a friend, John Nicholsen 
(T. 1, p. 9), Ms. McSharry asked for the money (T. 1, p. 162). 
According to Ms. McSharry, Worthen was drunk, belligerent and 
abusive (T. 1, p. 160-163). Instead of responding to the request 
for payment of the debt, Worthen began yelling at Ms. McSharry 
concerning a dispute over a loan of Worthen's truck to Ms. McSharry 
(T. 1, p. 11,66,160). Ms. McSharry testified that Worthen used 
"rough and foul" language and was extremely abusive (T. 1, p. 160). 
An argument ensued (T. 1, p. 11-12,66). 
^T.l refers to the transcript of the jury trial which 
occurred on January 20 and 21, 1986, while T.2 refers to the 
transcript of the bench trial held on February 11, 1986. 
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The evidence differs as to what occurred next. Worthen, r 
during the argument, Mr, 
Worthen and demanded the 
Bromfield and Nicholsen all testified that| 
Amador pulled out a gun, pointed it at Mr. 
money (T. 1, p. 12-14,67 113-120). Ms. McfSharry, on the other hand, 
testified that Mr. Amador intervened during the argument when Mr. 
Worthen appeared to be reaching for a machete for the purpose of 
attacking Ms. McSharry (T. 1, p. 165). Ms. McSharry further 
testified that Mr. Amador did not have a gun and did not coerce 
Worthen into paying the debt, directly contradicting the prosecution 
witnesses (T. 1, p. 160). Ms. McSharry also stated that Ms. 
Bromfield then asked Worthen to give McSharry some money, at which 
point Worthen took his wallet out of his pocket, opened it up, and 
threw twenty dollars at McSharry (T. 1, pi 166). 
Worthen testified that he gave the money to Amador because tL 
Amador stuck a gun in his face and threat ened to " blow his head out" 
rated by Ms. Bromfield and 
but stood in contradiction 
(T. 1, p. 70). His testimony was corroboji 
Mr. Nicholsen (T. 1, p. 12-14, 113-120), 
to that of Ms. McSharry (T. 1, p. 160). 
Approximately a day and a half ^fter the incident, Mr. 
Amador and Ms. McSharry were arrested based upon the complaint of 
Mr. Worthen and Ms. Bromfield (T. 1, p. 132-135). Upon a search of 
the automobile Mr. Amador was driving at the time of his arrest, the 
officers discovered a gun under the front passenger seat (T. 1, p. 
140). The automobile was owned by Ms. McSharry (T. 1, p. 107). Ms. 
McSharry testified that she, not Mr. Amador, owned the gun and that 
he had no knowledge of its presence under the seat in her car (T. 1, 
p. 167-168). The gun was identified by |Mr. Worthen as the gun he 
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claimed Mr. Amador produced during the incident at issue (T. 1, p. 
74). Ms. McSharry explained that Ms. Bromfield and Ms. Worthen 
could identify the gun because Worthen had repaired it for her prior 
to the incident (T. 1, p. 155). After deliberation of the evidence, 
the jury found the defendant, Mr. Amador, not guilty of aggravated 
robbery. 
Approximately two weeks after Mr. Amador's acquittal by the 
jury on the aggravated robbery charge, a trial was held before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on Count II, possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person. The Defendant moved the court for an 
Order of Dismissal of Count II, on the ground that the State was 
collaterally estopped from prosecuting the Defendant on Count II 
where the jury found the Defendant not guilty of Aggravated Robbery 
after considering the same evidence which would be presented by the 
State in its allegations that Defendant was a restricted person in 
possession of a dangerous weapon (T. 2, p. 3-7). Defendant argued 
that this prosecution on Count II was barred as double jeopardy (T. 
2, p. 3-7). 
Defendant's motions were denied (T. 2, p. 13). The 
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on Count II and the case 
was submitted for consideration to the Bench (T. 3, p. 14-15). By 
stipulation, the record of the first trial was incorporated into the 
record of the second trial and constituted the bulk of the evidence 
presented by the state to support the allegations of the state that 
Defendant was guilty of being a restricted person in possession of a 
dangerous weapon (T. 2, p. 15). The testimony of Defendant's parole 
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officer, John Shepherd, was also taken to establish that Defendant 
was a restricted person (T. 2, p. 16-19). The Defendant presented 
evidence that a firearm located under the passenger seat of the 
vehicle in which the Defendant was riding when arrested belonged to 
Ms. McSharry, who was also the owner of the car, and was placed 
there unbeknownst to the Defendant (T. 2, p. 22-27). A receipt for 
the purchase of the gun by Ms. McSharry wajs entered into evidence 
(T. 2, p. 26). 
Judge Wilkinson convicted Mr. Amajdor, finding, contrary to 
Ms. McSharry1s testimony, that Mr. Amador 
in the apartment of Worthen and Bromfield,! 
alleged aggravated robbery. From this conviction, this appeal is 
taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
did indeed possess a gun 
at the time of the 
Mr. Amador argues that the State(should have been 
i 
collaterally estopped from prosecuting hiib on the possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person charge because the jury 
i 
found him not guilty of aggravated robber]/ after considering the 
same evidence that was presented by the Spate in prosecuting the 
weapon charge. Since the prosecution did 
aggravated robbery, one of which was "use 
not prove the elements of 
of a firearm" in this 
case, it should not be allowed to prosecute on the weapon charge, 
using the same evidence which the prior t| 
insufficient. Such a prosecution should 
jeopardy. Appellant Amador contends that} 
violated his right against double jeopardy, the trial court 
committed reversible error in not granting his motion to dismiss. 
rier of fact found 
be barred as double 
because the second trial 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
APPELLANT AMADOR'S MOTION TO PROHIBIT 
THE TRIAL ON THE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON 
CHARGE AFTER HE WAS AQUITTED OF THE 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, if an issue 
of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
judgment that issue cannot be litigated again between the same 
parties in any future suit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
Conceding that this doctrine of "collateral estoppel" developed in 
civil litigation, the Court nevertheless held that it was embodied 
in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and thus is 
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Ashe, supra. 
In the instant case, a motion to sever was granted allowing 
separate trials for two charges filed against Mr. Amador (T. 2, p. 
8). Mr. Amador was tried by jury on the aggravated robbery charge 
(T. 1, p. 5) and tried by the bench on a separate charge of 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person (T. 2, p. 14). After 
careful consideration of all the evidence presented, the jury found 
that the State had not proven the elements of aggravated robbery 
beyond a reasonable doubt and thus found Mr. Amador not guilty (T. 
1, p. 250). The Judge nevertheless found Mr. Amador guilty of 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person, even though he 
considered only the evidence that was before the jury during the 
aggravated robbery trial (T. 2, p. 45). 
To establish the crime of robbery, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of the Defendant constituted 
an "unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the 
- 6 -
possession of another from his person, or ijmmediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-301(1). 
To establish aggravated robbery, the crime with which the 
Defendant was charged, the State must not only establish all of the 
above-listed elements of robbery beyond a teasonable doubt, but must 
additionally establish the use of a "firearm or facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife qr deadly weapon" or 
i 
"serious bodily injury of another" during the course of the 
robbery. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302(1)(a) and (b). 
Bodily injury was not an issue iiji the instant case. The 
I 
only evidence supporting the aggravated robbery charge was the 
testimony of witnesses who claimed that Mr. Amador used a gun during 
the alleged robbery (T. 1, p. 12, 67, 112). Indeed, these were the 
same and only witnesses who claimed that the incident in question 
was in fact a robbery (T. 1, p. 12-20, 66-72, 110-120). The defense 
witness testified that the defendant did not have a gun (T. 1, p. 
i 
160). Mr. Amador contends that his acquittal by the jury supports 
the conclusion that the jury chose to believe his witness over the 
i 
State's witnesses. This being the case, lit is reasonable to believe 
| 
that the jury did not find that the element of use of a weapon was 
I 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, support for this 
I 
proposition can be found in this Courtfs| cases concerning 
insufficiency of the evidence. When facpd with a challenge to the 
j 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982)1. Logically, when a jury's 
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verdict is acquittal, any reviewing court should view the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the defendant. In this case, Appellant 
Amador contends that the juryfs verdict requires that the testimony 
of Worthen, Nicholsen and Bromfield be disregarded. 
Given that Mr. Amador was acquitted by jury of the charge 
of aggravated robbery, an element of which is "use of a firearm", 
the defense moved for dismissal of the possession of a weapon 
charge, prior to the second trial (T. 2, p. 4). The motion was 
grounded upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Defense Counsel 
argued that inasmuch as the jury found, on the same evidence before 
the court, that the defendant was not guilty of aggravated robbery 
the State should be estopped from trying the Defendant on the 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person charge arising out of 
the same incident. The motion was denied (T. 2, p. 13). 
Mr. Amador agrees that it is not known, nor can it be 
known, exactly how the jury deliberated and upon what precise 
reasoning he was acquitted. However, he contends that the jury's 
acquittal, in light of the evidence presented, determined that the 
element of use of a firearm was not proven. Since the Judge had 
exactly the same evidence before him as the jury on the issue of use 
or possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person and since 
the acquittal evidences that this issue was decided, the State 
should have been estopped from trying the Defendant on the 
possession of a dangerous weapon charge. 
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The policy behind not allowing th^ State to try Mr. Amador 
on the weapon charge has been clearly articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court. That Court stated that: 
"[t]he underlying idea, one that is deeply 
ingrained in at least the Anglof-American 
system of jurisprudence, is thafc the State 
with all its resources and power should not 
be allowed to make repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a con 
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 
tinumg state 
even though 
This 
enhancing the possibility that 
innocent he may be found guiltV, 
underlying notion has from the very 
beginning been part of our constitutional 
tradition. Like the right to t|rial by jury, 
it is clearly "fundamental to tihe American 
scheme of justice." 
[395 US 796] 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), Quoting Green v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). This court has also recognized the 
policy served by the constitutional and statutory prohibitions 
against double jeopardy in holding that: 
The Clause does not allow "the 
to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offejnse," since 
"[t]he constitutional prohibit! 
•double jeopardy1 was designed! 
an individual from being subjej 
hazards of trial and possible 
State 
ion against 
to protect 
cted to the 
conviction 
more than once for an alleged offense. 
McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321 (Utah 198 
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). In this caseJ 
what the concept of double jeopardy is meant to prohibit. After an 
acquittal by a jury, the State tried Mr. Amador on exactly the same 
evidence until it was finally able to obtpain a conviction. 
3), quoting Burks v. United 
the State did precisely 
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Since trying the defendant on an issue already decided in a 
previous trial is a violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition 
against double jeopardy, applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), 
Appellant Amador contends that the trial on the possession of a 
dangerous weapon charge should not have been held and asks this 
court to reverse his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court allowed the State to prosecute Mr. 
Amador on a charge of possession of a weapon by a restricted person, 
after he was acquitted by a jury of an aggravated robbery charge 
arising out of the same incident and based upon the same evidence, 
Appellant requests this court find that Mr. Amador's constitutional 
right against double jeopardy has been violated, reverse his 
conviction and remand the case with an order dismissing the charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this'
 ;/^day of November, 1986. 
B*ROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, do hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
^+t J 
84114, this r -" day of November, 1986, 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED BY THIS DAY OF 
NOVEMBER, 1986. 
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ADDENDUM A 
»,..*». i,«R.e county Attorney 
By: ' HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
Deputy County Attorney 
3839 South West Temple, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Phone: (801) 264-2260 
1-A 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
X RAULE SHEL AMADOR aka 
WILLIAM D. JARAMILLO DOB: 3-3-60 
LUANN D. MCSHARRY DOB: 5-14-60 
Screened by: HRL 
Assigned to: HRL 
BAIL SUMMONS (Both Def.'s) 
INFORMATION 
SWV^IO v/o^Jys/' Crimlnal N o-85-CRM-u u s a b a 
Defendant(s) 0^^^^ T ? V S > 
The undersigned, JEFF ANDERSON, of the Murray Police 
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I: 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 4560 South 200 East, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 14, 1985, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that ^  the defendant^), RAULE SHEL 
AMADOR and— LUANN-D—MCSHARRY, as parties to the offense, unlawfully 
and intentionally took personal property in the possession of Danny 
Worthen from the person or immediate presence of 
against his will, by the use of a firearm or a 
firearm; 
Danny Worthen, 
facsimile of a 
COUNT II: 
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second, at 
4560 South 200 EAst, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
September 14, 1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 
503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RAULE SHEL AMADOR, a party to the offense, did have in his 
possession a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a .32 caliber handgun, and 
he is currently on parole from the Utah State Prison for a felony. 
Continued to Page 2. 
INFORMATION 
STATE v. RAULE SHEL AMADOR and LUANN D. MCSHARRY 
Page 2, 
COUNT III: 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 
1001, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended!, in that the defendant, 
RAULE SHEL AMADOR, committed the First Degree Felony in Count I 
above, and was then ad there a person who had been at least twice 
before convicted, sentenced and committed [for felony offenses, at 
least one of which offense having been at| least a felony of the 
second degree, and was committed to: 
EXAMPLE: 
1. Colorado State Penitentiary, on March i0, 1981, at Canyon City, 
Colorado, for the crime of Forgery, a secpnd degree felony, for a 
term of 1-15 years. 
2. Utah State Prison, on January 22, 19^2, at Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for the crime of Robbery, a second degree felony, for 
a term of 1-15 years. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
This charge is based upon Murray City Polide Report #85-12381, which 
states that the victim was in his own apartjment at the above address 
with the two defendants and others: 
After the victim said something to defendant McSharry, which 
defendant Amador did not like, Amador held a .32 caliber handgun to 
the victim's neck and McSharry took victim's wallet from the 
victim's trouser pocket. McSharry then topk $20 from the wallet and 
the two defendants left together. 
Amador is on parole from Utah State Prisori, and has been since July 
9, 1985. He has been convicted of second pegree forgery in Colorado 
and second degree robbery in Utah. He has been incarcerated at 
state penitentiaries in both Utah and Colorado. 
Continued on Page 3 
ADDENDUM B 
Attorney for Defendant 
SaTtTLake" Legal Defender^Assoc. 
333
 4South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Dtptf 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f 
vs . 
RAULE AMADOUR, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SEVER 
Case No. CR85-1464 
Judge HOMER F. WILKINSON 
The defendant RAULE AMADOUR, by and through his attorn 
of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, hereby moves this court to sever, fo 
purposes of trial, Counts I and II of the Information contained i: 
Case No. CR85-1464. Defendant bases this motion upon the precede 
set forth in the case of State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 
1985). 
DATED this day of January, 1986. 
"fl&6$J2 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
Z.fJtlejL 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake Cour, 
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth Sojuth, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this day of January, 1986. 
LttaU& 
C' 
£ Zo 
ADDENDUM C 
ggggw 
Dep» 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v s . 
RAULE SHEL AMADOR, 
VERDICT 
Case No. CR-85-1464 
Defendant 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find &Li&eJ!fe!&u« 
Raule Shel Amador, Not Guilty. 
•••••••••••••••••••••»••••••*•••••••••.•••••••••••.•••«•••••••••»•••••••••••••«*«••»•••••••••#••*••••••«•«««•««•••••••»••*••••«•••*•••••••••••#•••••••••••••••••••*••••»•«»••••< 
^tosJ^dL. 19 J.!P Dated 
/ 
rOfttUAN 
GOGC 
ADDENDUM D 
COUNSEL: (^ COUNSEL PRESENT) 
STATE OF UTAH irvs 
KOMIL, frmaJtwD 
7<H4*S&Ujrf-trrUy&lS1 \ 
/^d^^j'^d^U^'i' 
d A. CHILDS 
ALAN SMITH CLERK 
HOMER F. WILKINJ 
HON 
DATE: GRQVER MEDOEY 
BAILIFF 
OsfavtJ (hit 
OUMJ/AHUU^ 'tAMaf 
<^suJ ^ jM^uJ^fiu^/. 
JJUUV. 
^omus'^L&u/^ \^ifJdc&HJjLtvfca, 
^S1Lu/4dJ-
"TITLE: (*> PARTIES PRESENT) 
at « • m i r iuTir • 
COUNSEL: (*> COUNSEL PRESENT) 
"Awztl^^isrttAfr' STATE OF UTAH 
"V? 7% 
TP^ 
G. A. CMILP3 
ALAN SMSTS CLERK 
GROVER MEDLEY" 
HOMER F. WILK(N 
HON 
DATE: 
BAILIFF 
^^V^W^ 
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